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The  people  of Sri  Lanka  live  longer  than  those  of  South  Korea.  The  life
expectancy  of Sri  Lanka was  72  years compared  to 71  in South Korea in  1992.  Over
the  last  32  years  (1960-92),  Sri  Lanka  has  consistently  led  in  longevity.  This
phenomena  still  seems  to  continue  in  the  Asian  region.  In  contrast,  South  Korea
raised  its current  GNP per  capita  income  from  $310  in  1970  to  $6,790  in  1992,  an
increase  of over 2000%.  Despite  this miraculous economic  growth by any  standard,
South Korea  still needs  to catch up with the life expectancy rate of Sri Lanka  whose
GNP per capita  income  was $540  in  1992,  an  increase of less  than  185%  during  the
same  period  (Table  1).  Why  does  Sri  Lanka  demonstrate  a  relatively  common
feature in longevity with South Korea  despite a  significant real income gap?
Table 1:  Life Expectancy and GNP Per Capita Income in Sri Lanka and South Korea
Country  Years  Life Expectancy  GNP Per Capita
(Years)  (Current US$)
Sri  Lanka  1970  66  190*
1980  69  260
1990  71  470
1992  72  540
South  Korea  1970  65  310'
1980  66  1620
1990  71  5450
1992  71  6790
Note:  *1971  data.
Sources:  World Tables (1976)  and World Development Report
(1983,  1992, and 1994).
Many observers  have cited, explained,  and  even questioned  the experience  of
Sri  Lanka  as  an  "exceptional  achievement"  or  a  "superior  performance"  or even  as
an  "aberration"  (Ahluwalia  et  al.,  1979;  Bhagwati,  1988;  Bhalla,  1988;  Bhalla  and
Glewwe,  1986; Grant,  1978; Hopkins  and Jogaratnam,  1990; Isenman,  1980;  Kakwani,
1986;  Mendis,  1992a  and  1994;  Morris,  1979;  and  Sen,  1981,  1983,  and  1988).  South
Korea's  economic  success,  on the other hand,  is not only breath-taking  but  has been
1a  miraculous  achievement  in  the  world.  One  might  still  ask:  if  the  goal  of
development  is to improve  the living  standard  of its people,  why not  think  about
finding  ways  to  achieve  higher  human  development  as  in  Sri  Lanka?  Professor
Amartya Sen  (1983:  p. 453),  who  initially made the  analogy  between  Sri  Lanka  and
South Korea, states that:
If the government  of a  poor  developing  country  is  keen  to raise the level  of
health and the expectation  of life, then it would be pretty daft to try to achieve
this through raising  its income  per head,  rather than  going directly  for  these
objectives  through  public policy  and  social  change,  as China  and  Sri  Lanka
have both done.
These commentators  still  continue  to  raise  questions  in order  to  understand
the experience  of Sri Lanka  and the Four Tigers of  East Asia, especially  South Korea.
This  on-going discussion is a part of the major debate between economic growth  and
human  development,  the  market  approach  vs.  public  policy  intervention,  and
growth  vs. equity.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  two-fold:  the  first  part  is  to  understand  the
"virtuous  circles"  of economic  growth  and human  development;  the  second  part  is
to  review  the  development  literature  related  to  this  discussion.  For  this,  the
evolving  development  strategies  of Sri  Lanka  and  South  Korea  and  the  seemingly
convergent  two  schools  of thinking  are  briefly  outlined  in  Section  II.  Section  III
surveys  the pace of economic and human  progress  to give  a broad background  of the
debate.  Section  IV  analyzes  the  economic  growth  and  human  development  in
selected  Industrialized  Countries,  Newly  Industrialized  Countries  (NICs),  Emerging
NICs,  and  Aspiring  South  Asian  neighbors  of  Sri  Lanka.  Selected  Industrialized
Countries  include Japan,  Sweden,  and USA;  Newly Industrialized  Countries  (NICs)
are referred  to  as the four East Asian  tigers  of  Hong  Kong, Singapore,  South  Korea,
and Taiwan;  Emerging NICs are Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the Philippines,  Sri Lanka,  and
Thailand  whose real  GDP Per Capita  PPP$ exceeded  $2,000  in  1992.  Aspiring NICs
include  Bangladesh,  India,  Nepal,  and  Pakistan  (members  of  the  South  Asian
Association  of  Regional  Cooperation,  SAARC).  Sri  Lanka  is  also  a  member  of
SAARC.  In  the  second  part  of the  paper,  a  discussion  of economic  development
literature  and  the experience  of NICs  are reviewed  to learn  from  their  policies  and
strategies  in Section  V.  Section  VI ends  with some concluding  remarks.
2BACKGROUND:  VARYING  STRATEGIES AND SCHOOLS  OF THOUGHT
At  the  time  of  independence  from  Great  Britain  in  1948,  Sri  Lanka  had
reached  a  relatively high  level  of living standard  in  Asia.  For example,  Dr. Sarath
Rajapatirana  (1988:  p.  1143),  a World  Bank's  Policy Advisor,  writes  that  "Sri  Lanka
enjoyed  the third highest per capita  income in Asia after Japan and Malaysia"  in the
late 1940s.  In A Survey of South Korea, The  Economist  (1995: June 3,  p.1)  highlights
that "three decades  ago the average  Korean earned  around $100  a  year, less  than the
average Indian or Ghanaian.  Today South Korea's  GNP per head is $8,500,  30  times
India's  and 20  times Ghana's."  And, it is now  12 times that of Sri  Lanka.
South Korea,  after the brutal colonization  by Japan  (1910-45)  and  the civil  war
with communist  North  Korea  (1950-53),  was  an economic  basket  case before  it took
off as an affluent nation  in Asia.  This economic  progress  has been  achieved  within
a generation by the military dictator, Park Chung Hee (1961-79)  who was educated  in
Japan.  As  the  Korean  leader,  Park  essentially  emulated  the  Japanese  model  of
economic  development.  Now,  South  Korea  has  become  an  economic  model  for
others  to follow.
Compared  with South  Korea, Sri  Lanka  has been  seen  as  an economic  failure
and has  even  lagged  behind  the  Emerging  NICs of Indonesia,  the Philippines,  and
Thailand.  Why  has  Sri  Lanka,  who has  achieved  impressive  human  development
compared  to  South  Korea  and  others,  been  left  behind  in  its  economic  growth?
Does  the  varied  success  result  from  economic  policies  or  other  non-economic
factors,  such as cultural  endowments?
The  more  obvious,  and  commonly  identified,  reason  lies  on  the  realm  of
macroeconomic  policies.  South  Korea,  over  the  last  three  decades,  pushed  for
export-led  industrialization.  For  more  than  four  decades,  Sri  Lanka  has  followed
two  major  policy  choices  as  development  strategies:  First,  the  policy-makers
emphasized  the development  of social  welfare  through  public  policy interventions
in the areas  of education,  health,  and  food consumption,  especially  during the  1960-
77  period.  A  series  of land  reform  policies  in  1972  and  1976  was  followed  by  a
nationalization  of three  major  foreign  exchange  earners  of tea,  rubber,  and  coconut
as  well  as  several key  industries.  These  policies were  designed  to  achieve  a  more
egalitarian  and  self-sufficient  economy.  The  intellectual  support  for  the  socialist
3SLFP  (Sri Lanka  Freedom  Party)  government  to actively  pursue  these  welfare  and
inward-looking  development  strategies  came  from  the  Latin  American
structuralists,  particularly Raul  Prebish and  Ragnar  Nurkse.  Second,  this  dirigisme
approach  was  drastically  changed  into  a  package  of  more  market-friendly,  open
economic  policies with the change  of government in 1977.  The experience  in  1960s
and  part  of  the  1970s  was  characterized  by  slow  economic  growth,  rising
unemployment,  high inflation, increasing  budget  deficit,  and  difficulties  in  foreign
exchange.  Similar  to  the  intellectual  support  of  Latin  American  structuralists  in
1950s,  the  high  performing  economies  of the  NICs,  especially  South  Korea  and
Singapore, in the late  1970s  gave the rationale for  the 1977  UNP (right-wing United
National  Party)  government  to  adopt  out-ward  oriented  strategies.  The  new
economic package included  a wide range of liberalization  of trade and exchange  rate
policies,  removal  of  price  controls  and  ceiling  of  domestic  interest  rates,  and
encourages  foreign  investment  and  privatization  (Rajapatirana,  1994).  These  post-
1977  outward-looking  strategies  helped  achieve  a  relatively  higher  level  of
economic  growth,  which  is  similar  to  those  of  the  Emerging  NICs.  The  recent
experience  shows  that the liberalization  has been  an irreversible  process  despite  the
change  of  government.  The  SLFP-led  coalition  government,  which  returned  to
power  in 1994,  has fully  committed  to  pursue market-friendly  policies  for  economic
development.
The  two  contrasting  development  strategies  have  had  their  own  merits
which  would  serve  well  for  the  current  development  debate  between  economic
growth  and  human  development.  It  is  widely  believed  that  there  exists  a  positive
and  mutual  reinforcement  between  the  two  approaches.  The  World  Bank  has
capsulated  the basic premise  of their argument (World Development  Report  1991:  p.
36):
Human  development  and  poverty  alleviation,  on  the  one  hand,  and
economic  growth,  on  the  other,  seem  to  reinforce  each  other.  Human
development  and  poverty  alleviation  have  always  been  development  goals
in  the  eyes  of policy-makers  and  planners.  Their  methods,  however,  have
varied,  and  have  ranged  from  government  interventions  to  market
solutions.  Elements  of both  are  needed:  Market-oriented  policies  to  support
growth, together with well-targeted  social programs.
The  advocates  of  human  development  have  recognized  the  connection
between  the  two.  The  emphasis,  however,  is  different.  The  UN  Development
Programme  in its Human Development  Report  (1994:  p.  17) adds:
4More important  is the way  growth of  GNP  influences  human development.
There  is considerable  evidence  that  the  statistical  connection  between  GNP
per head and human  development  tends to work through  the effect of higher
GNP in raising public expenditure  and in lowering poverty.
These  assertions  imply  that  there  is  neither  a  real  debate  nor  a  conflict
between  the  two.  Rather,  it appears  that there  are  obvious  "virtuous  circles"  that
would  mutually  reinforce  economic  growth  and  human  development  for  higher
human  progress.  Here,  the  distinction  between  the  two  needs  to  be  clarified:  if
human  progress  means,  in  a  broad  sense,  to  increase  the  quality  of  overall
livelihood  of people, the economic growth  is a  means  to achieve  it.  As  a  means,  of
course,  economic  growth  is very  important  but not a  sufficient  basis  in  achieving
the end itself.  Human  development  in essence  is an end.
The  economic  growth  in  South  Korea  has,  for  example,  contributed  to  a
higher  level of human capacity  development with  an element of high  cost while Sri
Lanka  achieved  it at a  relatively  low cost.  Still, South  Korea needs  to catch  up with
Sri  Lanka.  If  the  argument  made  earlier  by  Professor  Amartya  Sen,  now  the
President  of  American  Economics  Association,  is  still  valid,  the  methods  of
achieving development  goals, not  the means,  should  then be  reconsidered.
m
LEGACY OF ECONOMIC AND HUMAN PROGRESS
It is  always  easier  to emulate  and  catch  up than  to innovate  and  lead.  The
history  of  economic  growth  illustrates  that  it  is  quite  possible  for  a  country  to
develop faster than  in  the past  by following  a leader.  Others,  of course,  take much
longer,  depending  largely  on  the circumstances  and  their economic  policies.  In  the
19th century,  the  UK took  58 years  (1780-1838)  to  double its per capita  income  and
the US  took 47  years  (1839-86).  Japan  did  it in  34  years  (1885-1919).  The World
Development  Report  (1991: pp.  12-13)  further states that after World  War  II, several
countries  doubled  their  per  capita  output  even  faster  than  Japan:  Indonesia  in  17
years, South Korea in 11,  and China in 10.  By  1992, the fast growing East Asian high
performing  economies  took  a  miraculously  shorter  time-span  to  double  their  per
capita output.  South Korea doubled its per head GNP approximately  in four years by
1992  (Figure  1).  Thailand in five and Japan  in six  compared  to  the US  and Sweden
in  12 years.  Japan,  whose  income  per capita  surpassed  the US  in 1988  ($19,770) and
5Figure  1:  Doubling  Years  of  GNP  Per Capita Output  by  1992,
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6Sweden in  1987 ($15,870),  maintained  the lead at $28,190 in  1992.  Sri Lanka  needed
closer  to  17  years.  Sri Lanka's  neighboring  countries  of Bangladesh,  India,  Nepal,
and Pakistan took well over 20  years to double their per capita output.  South Korea
and other East Asian  neighbors  who emulated  the Japanese  model  grew faster  than
their  leader.  The  policy-makers  of  the  South  Asian  Association  for  Regional
Cooperation  (SAARC)  have  followed  the  lead  of  Sri  Lanka  which  modeled  after
South Korea  and Singapore in 1977.
It appeared  that not only  in  the level  of per  capita  income,  progress  is  also
made in  life  expectancy  and  literacy  rate  as  reflected  by the  positive  relationship
between  the GNP per capita  and  the Human  Development  Index  (HDI) in selected
countries  (Figure  2).  But, economic  growth  is not  synonymous  with  development.
The  measure  of  economic  growth  in  a  per  capita  unit  has  a  limited  explanatory
power  to  measure progress in  education,  health,  and nutrition though  traditionally
it was  assumed  that GNP  per capita  captured  the essence  of  human  development.
Beyond  economic  growth,  development  means  the  general  improvement  of  the
conditions  of  human  livelihood  including  access  to  education,  better  health  care
facilities,  adequate  consumption  of food, employment opportunities,  and  protection
of the environment.  The measure  of  human development  as  captured  in  HDI also
excludes  the  broader  changes  in  political,  social,  and  cultural  aspects  of  human
endeavors.  The  HDI,  however,  represents  a  broader  measure  of  human
development  than  GNP  per  head.  The  Index  has  encompassed  the  triple
components  of human development:  1) life expectancy  as  a  measure  of health  care
delivery  system  and  the  ability  of  people  to  live  longer  to  achieve  their  goals;  2)
adult  literacy  as  a  component  to  get  and  maintain  a  job  and  to  understand  the
surroundings  and culture;  and  3) purchasing  power parity  (PPP) which  is calculated
in a  manner  that per capita income is adjusted  to account  for  national differences  in
exchange  rates,  tariff, and tradable goods.  The PPP demonstrates  the relative  ability
to  buy a basket  of  commodities  to  meet  basic  human  needs  (Gall,  1991:  pp.  4-12).
Obviously,  the  positive  relationship  between  the  two  in  Figure  2  is  not  equally
divided  (in 45  degrees).  The direction  of  the path  indicates  that social and  human
development at the initial stage has attributed relatively more to the progress of HDI
in  developing  countries  (cf.  Aspiring  NICs  of  South  Asia)  than  to  those  of
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8industrialized  and  East  Asian  countries.  The  push  for relatively  higher  economic
growth has more response  from  the developed  countries  because they  have already
reached  closer  to a plateau  in human  development  potential  relative  to  developing
countries.
The  general  notion  is,  however,  that  high  quality  of  life  requires  higher
income.  With  economic  growth  strategies,  it  is  assumed  that  people  may  have
access  to  better education,  higher  level  of health  and  nutrition,  less  poverty  and
more  equitable  opportunities,  richer  cultural  and  social  life,  cleaner  environment,
and  greater  individual  freedom.  In a  traditional  sense,  this  is what  we  primarily
expect  of  economic  development.  The  NICs  of  East  Asia  generally  sustained  a
higher  level  of  economic  growth  which  in  turn  gave  rise  to  a  higher  human
development  index.
The  positive  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  human
development  as  depicted  in Figure 2 does not, however,  explain  the degree  to which
one influences  the  other.  The  conventional  view  is  that  economic  growth  led  by
export-pushed  industrialization,  especially  in NICs,  would enhance  the level  of the
human  development.  Or,  one  might  question:  Is  it  the  other  way  around?
Investing  in  human  capital,  as  these  countries  simultaneously  did,  would  also
enhance  production  and  material  prosperity  and  economic  growth.  In  Sri  Lanka,
however,  the  relatively  higher  human  development  did not yield  a  higher  level of
economic and material  advancement.  Yet,  the relatively  low per capita GNP left Sri
Lanka  behind  the  other  Emerging  NICs  because  of  a  lower  and  slower  pace  of
economic  growth.  Thus,  experience  has  shown  that  economic  growth  naturally
gives  impetus  to  higher  human  development.  But,  many  other  factors,  such  as
cultural,  social,  and various  forms  of structural  rigidities  in the economy  may  have
inhibited  economic  growth.  Whether  these  factors  are  represented  in  the  measures
of  GNP  per  head  or  HDI,  the  degree  of  influence  on  each  other  is  difficult  to
disaggregate.  The composition  of HDI may still serve as  a better way to  understand
the influence of and impact on income and human capacity  development,  especially
when HDI is  internationally standardized  for  comparative  analysis.
9IV
EXPANDING  HUMAN  CAPABILITIES AS THE GOAL
If economic  growth  is  a  means, not  an end itself,  to  economic  development,
the  expansion  of  human  capabilities  to  their  fullest  would  be  the  goal  of
development.  Sen  (1984),  who  pioneered  this  human  capabilities  approach,
characterizes  it as  a  process  of expanding  the  capabilities  of people.  Furthermore,
Sen  (1983:  p. 755)  states that "economic growth is only  a means  and often not  a very
efficient means either."  Griffin and Knight (1989:  p. 9) remind us that:
The  ultimate  focus  of economic  development  is human  development.  That
is,  we  are  ultimately  concerned  with  what  people  are  capable  of  doing  or
being.  Can  they  live long?  Can  they be well  nourished?  Can  they escape
avoidable  illness?  Can they obtain dignity and  self-respect?  Are they able  to
read  and write and  communicate  and develop  their mind?
To expand human  capabilities,  there  must be technologies,  institutions, social
and  cultural  values  that  can  facilitate  in order  to  enhance  human  potential.  The
increase  of  income  in  fact  helps  advance  human  capacity  but merely  adding  more
inputs  may  not  guarantee  proportional  expansion  of  human  capabilities.  If
economic  growth  is seen  as  a  means  to human  development,  the synergy  between
the  two should exist for  more innovations  and efficiencies.  It must then  come  from
enhancing  people's  capabilities.  Income  would, therefore,  be an  avenue  to a  certain
point for  proportional  returns  but beyond  the  optimum  level  it yields  diminishing
returns  unless  human  capacity  develops  with  more  technical  efficiency  for  higher
human  progress.
Some  evidence  indicates  that  over  the  past  three  decades  or  so  (1960-91),
economic  growth  has  been  accompanied  by  an  increase  in human  capabilities.  If
one  takes  the HDI  as an internationally  comparable  surrogate-indicator  for human
capabilities  and economic growth  as indicated  by the GDP per capita  PPP$, economic
growth  has  generally  shown  a  greater  increase  than  the  HDI  (Table  2).  Table  2,
column  C for example, indicates  the  absolute  increase of real  GDP per capita  income
for  each  country.  Japan  and  Sweden  raised  their  per  capita  income  by 618%  and
170%  respectively from  1960 to  1991.  South Korea  increased  it by  1,106%,  US  122%,
and  Sri Lanka only  91%.  The absolute increase  of HDI during the  1960-92 period  in
column  F was  less  dramatic:  South  Korea  116%,  Sri  Lanka  40%,  Japan  35%,  and
Sweden  and  the  US  7%  each.  With  only  7%  increase  of HDI, Sweden  and  the  US
10Table 2: Relative Human Capacity Change with the Growth of Real GDP Per Capita
and the Improvement of HDI, Selected  Countries
Real GDP Per Capita Growth  Human Development Index  Relative
PPP$  % Absolute  HDI  Values  % Absolute  Human
Country/Development  1960  1991  Increase  1960  1992  Increase  Capacity
Status  1960-91  _1960-92  Index*
A  B  C  D  E  F  G
Industrialized  Countries
Japan  2701  19390  618  0.686  0.929  35  6
USA  9983  22130  122  0.865  0.927  7  6
Sweden  6483  17490  170  0.867  0.928  7  4
NICs
South Korea  690  8320  1106  0.398  0.854  116  10
Singapore  2409  14734  512  0.519  0.836  61  12
Emerging NICs
Indonesia  490  2550  420  0.223  0.586  163  39
Malaysia  1783  7400  315  0.33  0.794  131  45
Philippines  1183  2440  106  0.419  0.621  48  45
Sri Lanka  1389  2650  91  0.475  0.665  40  44
Thailand  985  5270  435  0.373  0.798  114  26
Aspiring NICs
Bangladesh  621  1160  87  0.166  0.309  86  99
India  617  1150  86  0.206  0.382  85  99
Nepal  584  1130  93  0.128  0.289  126  135
Pakistan  820  1970  140  0.183  0.391  115  82
Note:  *The change  of Relative  Human  Capacity  Index  (column  G)  is  calculated  by the  change  in
absolute  increase  of  HDI  value  which  is  (column  F)  divided  by  the  change  in  absolute
increase of PPP$ value (column C) between the two time periods.
Source:  Human  Development Report (1994).
have  reached  closer  to  a  saturation  point  whereby  the  increase  of  income  has
relatively  less  impact  on  human  development.  This  is  shown  in  the  Relative
Human  Capacity  (RHC) Index in column  G which has increased  only 6%  for the US
and  4%  for  Sweden  if both  countries  were  to  increase  their  per  capita  income  by
122%  and 170% respectively.  Japan needed to increase 618% of its income in order to
increase the HDI of 35%  (column F) during  the 30 year period.  The Relative Human
Capacity Index has changed  only  by 6%  in Japan,  similar to the US.  The US needed
only 122%  increase of GDP per head  (rather than  618%  increase in Japan)  in order to
achieve  the result  of Japan.  Japan,  with  a  relative  high increase  in per  capita  and
HDI, has also reached  closer to  a plateau  of RHC Index.  The highest level of human
11development  (i.e.,  humanly possible average life expectancy,  say, up to 80 years, and
the literacy rate which is  100% in Japan,  Sweden,  and  the US) can only  be extended
to a point.  Beyond  that, the increase  in income to raise human  capacities  would be
diminishing.  At this  point two things can occur:  First, the quality of human  life can
be  expanded  in  a  form  of  more  leisure  time  for  personal,  family,  and  civic
fulfillment  which  are  seemingly  declining  as  countries  become  more  developed.
Second,  economic  progress  can  be  enhanced  by  more  innovations  and  technical
efficiency.  Over  the  past 30  year  period,  for  example,  the  US  with relatively  less
increment  in GDP per  capita  (column  C)  has  shown  the least  cost effective  way  to
enhance  human  capabilities  (column  F).  In other  words,  industrialized  countries
have  achieved  their  fullest  potential  in  human  development;  therefore,  the
increase  in  income  per capita  must then  be diverted  to  more innovation  to  increase
efficiency and productivity.
The  impact  of  other  groups  of  countries  significantly  differed,  however:
South Korea with its impressive growth in per capita product of 1,106%  from  1960 to
1991  also  increased  human  development  more  than  any  other  NICs  or
industrialized  countries.  But,  the level  of RHC  was  only  10%  which  indicates  the
reaching  of  a  plateau  similar  to  those  of  industrialized  countries.  The  increase  in
per  capita  did  not  proportionally  raise  the  HDI;  thus,  the  additional  increase  in
human  capability  must then be  focused  more  on  increasing  the  quality,  efficiency,
and  productivity.  South  Korea's  record,  according  to  the World  Bank's  study  on
The East Asia Miracle  (1993),  shows  that nearly  two-thirds  of the growth  between
1960  and  1989  reflects  the  accumulation  of inputs  rather  than  improvements  in
efficiency.  This  implies  that  South  Korea's  achievement  has  not  come  chiefly
because  the level  of human  development  arrived  with  a  relatively  higher  price  as
well  as more inputs  than other  countries.
Among  the Emerging  NICs,  Thailand  was the one  that achieved  a  relatively
better  result:  by increasing  its per  capita  product  (435%),  Thailand's  HDI  changed
114%,  giving a  26%  of RHC.  This increase  resulted  in higher  economic  growth  but
the HDI also  increased  simultaneously.  Malaysia,  however,  raised  its HDI  higher
than Thailand  (column  F in Table 2)  but it was achieved  by increasing the relatively
lower  level  of economic  growth  (column  C).  Sri  Lanka  with  the  least  increase  of
GDP per capita  of 91%  raised  the HDI by only 40%.  It demonstrates  that the RHC in
the  Emerging  NICs  ranged  from  26%  in  Thailand  to  45%  in  Malaysia  and  the
12Philippines.  These  numbers  indicate  that  there  still  exists  more  potential  to
enhance  the  RHC  by  increasing  both  income  and  human  development.  These
patterns  also  suggest that relatively  higher  increase  in  income  growth  would  still
yield  higher  human  development  but  the  returns  for  human  development  have
been  diminishing  as economic  growth increased.
Nepal  as  one  of  the  poorest  in  the  region  had  the  greatest  potential  for
increasing its RHC.  With a  relatively  low increase in  income of 93%  during this 30-
year  period,  Nepal's  HDI  hiked  126%.  This  implied  that  Nepal's  human
development  capacity was less  responsive  to economic growth.  The change  in HDI
(especially  in  health  and  education  sectors)  has  greater  impact  in  Nepal  than  its
neighbors  of SAARC.  The  increase  of per capita  in India  and  Bangladesh has  been
more or  less proportional  to  the increase  in human  development  with a  RHC  Index
of 99  (column  G).
The  figures  in  Table  2  suggest that  countries  in  various  levels  of economic
growth responded  differently  to the change  in human development  or  vice versa.  It
appeared  that  human  development  in  industrialized  countries  was  less  influenced
by  economic growth.  The NICs are  catching up  to the plateau  of the industrialized
countries.  The  Emerging  NICs,  especially  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and  Thailand,
pushed  for  higher  economic  growth  because  their  responsive  rate  was  relatively
greater  in  changing  human  development.  The  Aspiring  NICs  were  the  least
responsive  to economic  growth,  especially  Nepal;  thus,  this experience  implies  that
more emphasis  on  public policy intervention  in social infrastructure  would be more
appropriate  than increasing  economic  growth  in the poorest countries.  This  can  be
explained  in  part  by  the  relatively  non-existence  or  poor  social  and  capital
infrastructure  for markets  to operate  in order to impact on economic  growth.  Thus,
this  analysis  may  point  to  a  direction  that  the  level  of  "virtuous  circles"  and  their
mutual  re-inforcement  come  at  various  stages  based  on  the  country's  level  of
development.
Quality of Life with Industrial Growth
Life expectancy,  one  of the  three components  of  HDI,  has  become  the most
attentive measure  of social  welfare because  it reflects  the  progress  in nutrition  level
and  the  improvement  in  health  delivery  and  treatment  and  control  of  disease.
13Education  plays an important  role in  this process by diffusing the knowledge  about
micro-nutrients  and  treatment  and  prevention  of  diseases.  With  rapid  income
growth  and  high human  development,  most NICs  are beginning  to resemble  a  life
expectancy  and  demographic  profile  of  those  industrialized  countries.  However,
industrialization  accompanied by an increase  in the industrial related  death pushed
down  the  life  expectancy.  The  World  Development  Report  (1991:  p.  62)
summarizes:
In  Korea,  rapid  industrial  growth  and  urbanization  have  also  changed  life-
styles and shifted  the epidemiological  profile.  In heart disease and stroke, and
injuries from  accident  and violence;  these accounted  for 60  percent  of deaths
in  1987.
It  is  clear  that  environmental  pollution  and  other  negative  externalities
resulting  from  urbanization  and  industrialization  are  associated  with  the  quality
and longevity of life.  In Sri Lanka, the  level of urbanization  and industrialization  is
low  among  the NICs  (Figure 3).  The success  in  Japan has  evidently  accompanied
stricter  environmental  regulation  and  promotion  of  a  health-conscious  populous.
Still, the quality of life has raised  several concerns,  such as  stress, long hours of work
etc.,  among Japanese workers.
Over the past  30 years, life  expectancy  has  increased  as  well  as  the number  of
doctors.  This  positive  relationship  varies  country  to  country  but the  direction  of
progress  indicates  that when countries  become more industrialized  or  increase  their
per capita  income, both life expectancy  and the number of doctors increase  (Table  3).
The  NICs, for example,  are far behind  the number of doctors  per 10,000  people than
those of Western  industrialized  countries.  By  1990, per 10,000 people,  the US had 24
doctors,  Sweden  31,  Switzerland  29 compared  to those of Japan  16,  South  Korea  9,
Malaysia  4,  Thailand  2,  and  Sri  Lanka  1.5.  In  Sri  Lanka,  the number of doctors had
declined from 2.2 in  1960  to  1.5 in  1990 partly because  highly trained  physicians  left
the  country.  A similar  pattern  is  shown  in  the  Philippines:  there were  6.7  doctors
per  10,000  people  in  1975 which  was reduced  to  1.5 in  1990.  The causes  for decline
may be associated  with the push  and pull  factors.  The push comes from  the ethnic
and  political  situation  in  Sri  Lanka  and  the  Philippines.  The pull  factor  may  be
related  to  brain  drain.  From  an  economic  point  of view,  training  doctors  is  also
more costlier  than producing  teachers.
14Figure  3:  Rapid  Urbanization,  Selected  Countries
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15Table 3:  Income,  Life Expectancy,  and Number of Doctors
Country  GNP Per Capita $  Life Expectancy  (vrs) Doctors Per 10.000 People
1971  1991  1960  1990  1960  1990
Industrialized Countries
Japan  2,130  26,840  68  79  10.2  15.7
USA  5,320  22,340  68  76  14.4  24
Sweden  4,960**  25,560  74  78  9.5  31.1
NICs
South Korea  310  6,350  56  71  2.8  9.3
Singapore  14,734  68*  74  4.3  12
Emerging NICs
Indonesia  90  610  48*  62  0.2  1.3
Malaysia  410  2,520  57  70  1.5  3.8
Philippines  210  740  51  64  1.4  1.5
Sri Lanka  190  500  63  71  2.2  1.5
Thailand  210  1,650  59*  66  1.3  2
Aspiring NICs
Bangladesh  130**  180  48*  52  N/A  1.6
India  240**  360  41  59  2.1  3.8
Nepal  44*  52  0.1  0.5
Pakistan  220**  370  49*  56  1.7  5.3
Note:  *1970* data,  **1972  data.
Sources:  World Tables (1994),  World  Development  Report (1994,)  Military and  Social  Expenditures
(1991  and 1993), and Human Development  Report (1994).
Learning for Innovation
If the NICs  were  to emulate the  economic  leadership  of Japan,  the  economic
edge must  come from  the propensity  to  adapt into new ways of doing  things.  In  a
South Korea  Survey,  The  Economist (1995:  June 3,  p. 17) points out that:
The country is  at that glorious  stage of development  when it is brimming with
learning  and ideas but has not yet become complacent.  Anyone who is anyone
in  South  Korea  seems  to  have  a  doctorate,  often  from  America;  everyone  is
bent on mastering new technologies  and business methods.
The  increase  in  investment  on  productive  economic  sectors  must then  come
with  enhancing  the  capabilities  of  their  human  resources.  The  expenditure  for
education,  as  indicated  in  Table  4,  has  increased  in  Malaysia,  Singapore,  South
Korea,  and  Thailand.  As  seen  by  the  share  of  government  expenditure  on
education,  the salient  characteristic  of these economies  is  that  they  are consistently
16Table 4:  Government Expenditures on Education  in Selected  Countries
County  Goverment Expenditures as Percentage of GNP
1960  1990
Industrialized Countries*
Japan  4.9  5
USA  5.3  7
Sweden  5.9  6.5
NICs
South Korea  2  3.6
Singapore  2.8  3.4
Emerging NICs
Indonesia  2.5
Malaysia  2.9  6.9
Philippines  2.3  2.9
Sri Lanka  3.8  2.7
Thailand  2.3  3.8
Aspiring NICs
Bangladesh  0.6  2
India  2.3  3.5
Nepal  0.4
Pakistan  1.1  3.4
Note:  *As Percentage of GDP
Source:  Human  Development Report (1994).
committed  to  education.  Sri  Lanka,  however,  has  shown  a  reduction  during  the
period of 1960-90 but the number  of teachers  per 10,000 heads  had  increased  during
the same period  (Table 5).  The  literacy rate  in  Sri  Lanka rose  from  61%  in  1960  to
88%  in  1990.  Overall,  the NICs  and the Emerging NICs  all shared  a  common  value
on  education  and had  reached  a  higher  literacy  rate  closer  to  those of the Western
industrialized  countries  when  they  were  at  that stage.  The  progress  of education
and literacy rate is an indication of achieving  a  goal of human development.
The  quality  of education  and  training  still  must improve  as  these  countries
enter  into  a  greater  level  of  technology-based  development.  The  duration  of
attending  school  is,  however,  consistently  lower  than  those  of  industrialized
countries  whose  years  generally  exceed  11.  The  mean  years  of  schooling  in  Sri
Lanka  was 7 years  as opposed  to 4 years  in Thailand.  However,  Thailand  had  a 93%
literacy  rate  compared  to  89%  in  Sri  Lanka  in  1990.  Malaysia  achieved  an  88%
literacy rate with only 6 years of schooling (Table 5).
17Table 5:  Literacy Rate, Number of Teachers, and Years of Schooling
in Selected  Countries
Years of
Country  Literacy  Rate  %  Number of Teachers  Schooling
(Per 10.000 People)  (Average  Years)
1960  1990  1960  1990  1992
Industrialized Countries
Japan  98  99  79  80  11
USA  98  99  89  109  12
Sweden  98  99  86  116  11
NICs
South Korea  91*  96  32  66  9
Singapore  50  99  67  63  4
Emerging NICs
Indonesia  39  77  27  114  4
Malaysia  48  88  195  108  6
Philippines  72*  90  50  63  8
Sri Lanka  61  88  73  92  7
Thailand  - 93  46  85  4
Aspiring NICs
Bangladesh  10*  35  20  30  2
India  24  48  35  47  2
Nepal  10  26  6  46  2
Pakistan  16  35  17  33  2
Note:  *1970 data
Sources:  World  Tables  (1994),  World  Development  Report  (1994,) Military  and  Social  Expenditures
(1991  and 1993), and Human Development Report (1994).
The  literacy  rate itself does not reflect  the quality of education  and training.'
As  countries  become  rapidly  developed  the  quality  of  the  labor  force  should  be
enhanced.  Malaysia  and  Thailand  may  have  a  problem  because  when  their
economies  enter  into  a  upper league  of NICs,  workers  need  to  be better  equipped
especially  if they at least have secondary  education.  The highly educated  labor force
in Japan  and South Korea, beyond just literacy level,  is a leading edge.  Japan's rapid
industrialization  after  the  Meiji  Restoration  (1868-1912)  was  induced  by its  strong
commitment  to  education  and  training,  especially  in  technical  skills.  Since  the
1960s,  the  industrialization  in  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  developed  their  most
needed  science  and  engineering  skills  by  sending  their  students  to  American
'For an analysis of international  differences  in the quality of human capital,  see Peterson  (1989).
18universities.  But the  strong commitment  to human  capital  accumulation  in South
Korea  began  during  the  period  of  1910-45  (Japanese  occupation)  with  foreign
assistance and on-the-job-training.  In the late 1940s  and 1950s, South Korea focused
on adult literacy and started sending many students  overseas  for advanced  technical
training  (Pack  and  Westphal,  1986:  pp.  87-128).  This  advantage  is  lacking  in
emerging  Malaysia  and  Thailand  where  they  need  to  prepare  for  a  technically
sophisticated  labor  force  to compete  in the world economy  (The  Economist,  1994:  p.
31).  Education  and training becomes  one of the most important factors  in increasing
technical  efficiency  and producing  innovation.
Income  Disparity and Economic  Growth
The  mainstream  economists  and  policy-makers  have  long  been convinced  to
believe  that  economic  growth  fosters  greater  equity.  Theoretically,  it  is  logical  to
assume  the  existence  of such  a  positive  pattern  between  the  two.  Japan  and  the
NICs have  a pattern  of relatively  more equitable  income  and wealth distribution  as
their income  rises  (Figure 4).  The Kruznet  curve  also demonstrates  that inequality
exists  to  a  point before  more equality  appears  as  countries  increase  their GNP  per
capita.  In practice,  the theory  then  tends  to  prove  the conventional  notion  of  the
positive  linkages  between  economic  growth  and  equity.  With  higher  income,
people have better access to education  and  the health delivery  system;  therefore,  the
trickle down of economic growth  is said  to reach  to many people  through education
and  the  health  care  mechanism.  Thus,  education  and  health  would  serve  as  the
wealth  and  income  equalizing  forces.  Here,  it  is  assumed  that  countries  would
already  have  a  sufficient  social  infrastructure.  In  this  case,  one still  can  raise  the
question:  At  what  level,  does  a  country  decide  to  pursue  a  human  development
approach  vs. economic  growth  strategies?  In the  case of Nepal,  as  seen  earlier,  the
viability  of economic  growth  strategies  has  been  weak  because  the  Nepalese  have
not yet acquired  the basic social  infrastructure  for  economic  growth  to  take  place.
The  growth-led  strategies  of the  NICs,  for  example,  were  followed  by  a  range  of
social  infrastructure  policies  as well  as land  reforms,  especially  in  Japan  and South
Korea.  A  relatively  higher  income  equality  in  the  East  Asian  countries  was  not
completely  attributed  to  economic  growth  strategies  alone.  The  necessary
foundation  for  a  greater  distribution  of income  may  have  resulted  from  social  and
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20land reform policies  (Haggard,  1992:  pp. 223-253;  Mason et al  1980; and Rao,  1988).
The  concurrent  economic  growth  strategies  have  complemented  the  process  of
human  development.
In Sri  Lanka,  however,  a  variety  of social  welfare programs  and land reform
legislation  did  not yield  an anticipated  greater  income  distribution  as  they  did  in
South  Korea.  Instead, the income disparity  in  Sri  Lanka  has widened  during these
years  (Figure  5).  The  post-1977  economic  strategies  have  further  increased  the
inequality in contrast  to both the Kruznet  curve  and  the path  of NICs  which  have
come to share similar experiences.  Sri  Lanka,  afflicted  by entrenched  ethnic  conflict
and guerrilla  warfare,  may have potentially  blocked  the path of NICs  status.  But,
similar  experiences  in  South  Korea,  in  the  form  of  repression  and  authoritarian
governance,  have  caused  some  set  backs  even  after  Park  Chung  Hee  (military
strongman  from  1961  to  1979).  The  negative  impact  on  economic  growth  has
appeared  to  be  milder  in  South  Korea  than  in  Sri  Lanka  with  relatively  more
democratic leaders.
The  experience  suggests  that  the "best way" would  not always  grant  a  more
equitable  income distribution as shown  in Figure 4.  Some countries, particularly  Sri
Lanka,  Malaysia, and  even  the US, have  not necessarily  followed  the  path ascribed
by  the  mainstream  which  advocates  that  greater  equity  follows  with  economic
growth.  Other factors  may have influenced  the direction of change.  A host of public
policy interventions  could  well be  associated  with such  a change.  The  experience  in
Sri  Lanka  illustrates  that  the  gap  between  the  rich  and  poor  has  been  increasing
despite  land  reforms  (in  1972  and  1976)  and  trade  liberalization  (after  1977);
however,  after  the  massive  income  transfer  through  the  Poverty  Alleviation
Programme  (known  as Janasaviya),  Sri  Lanka  for  the  first  time reached  a  .32  Gini
coefficient  in  1990  (Figure  5).  With  the  Janasaviya  Programme,  a  target  group  of
people below the poverty line (estimated  one-half of the population) were  eligible to
receive  income in a form of cash and food items (Mendis,  1992b).
In general,  this analysis  suggests  two possible outcomes:  First,  the equality  of
income  distribution  tends  to  follow  the  direction  of  economic  growth  if  the
necessary  conditions  prevail  in  the  economy.  The  NICs  of  East  Asia,  with  their
efficient  and  broad  base  employment-intensive,  economic  growth  promoted  social
infrastructure  and vice  versa.  It was  a  virtuous  circle  for them.  The best  way then
21Figure  5:  The  Direction  of  Income  Inequality  in  Sri  Lanka
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22for NICs to achieve  a more equitable income  distribution  is by  investing  in human
capital  as a  long-term  investment for high  rates  of return.  Second,  a  government
intervention  in  a policy  of income  transfer  to poor people could  change  the  income
distribution  more effectively and rapidly than the  trickle down of economic growth.
The  question  of  funding  for  such  income  transfer  without  economic  growth  is
challenging  for  some  countries,  especially  the  Aspiring NICs  of South  Asia.  The
best way to achieve a higher human development  is by promoting economic growth
and by ensuring that growth is closely linked  with human well-being.
V
NICs IN RETROSPECT:  LESSONS FOR SRI LANKA AND OTHER COUNTRIES
The  common  characteristics  of  these  East Asian  high  performing  economies
are not well  understood.  For  some, these countries  provide  the lessons of the right
development  path  for  others  to  emulate;  others  have  questioned  the way in which
these miracles are being performed.  In the second part of this paper, recent research
findings  are  reviewed  to  understand  better  the  critical  areas  of  development
literature:  growth  and  human  development,  mechanics  of  economic  growth,  the
role of state and market, and economic  growth and environment.
Growth and Human Development
Those  who  advocate  the  economic  growth  strategies,  especially  the  Britton
Wood  institutions,  emphasize  that  the  maximization  of  wealth  and  income  is
inherent  in  the  leisser-faire,  market  economics;  therefore,  free  market  economics
naturally  bring  about  further  growth.  It  is  assumed  that growth  strategies  will
eventually  lead to a  more equal income distribution,  as shown  in some of the NICs.
Thus,  it  is  argued  economic  growth  is  the  better  strategy  for  development.
Economic  growth  is  definitely  important  to  human  development  and  has  shown
that  there  exists  a  positive  relationship  between  the  two.  On  the  other  hand,  a
strategy  of human  development  could  well  be  a  better  way  to  advance  economic
growth  because  the  development  of  human  capabilities  provide  the  necessary
foundation  for  the  market  system  to  work.  Those  who  believe  in  the  human
development  approach  argue  that  their  approach  is  inherently  ascribed  to  greater
equality  as  opposed  to  the  promoters  of economic  growth.  Economic  growth  is
more concerned  with  income  maximization,  not distribution.
23The  emerging  human  development  school  of  thought  is  more  vigorously
advocated  by  the  UN  Development  Programme  and  UNICEF  which  assert  that
"Improving  human  capital  does,  of  course,  enhance  production  and  material
prosperity  --  as it has in Japan and East Asia"  (Human Development  Report  1994: p.
17).  The World  Bank,  the long advocate of economic  growth strategies,  has recently
revised its view  closer  to  the people-centered  development.  A former  World  Bank
President, Barber  Conable (World  Development  Report,  1991: p. iii) has captured  the
change  in  thinking:
First, investing  in  people  requires  an  efficient  public  role.  Markets  alone
generally  do not ensure  that people,  especially  the poorest,  receive  adequate
education,  health  care,  nutrition,  and  access  to  family  planing.  Second,
essential  for enterprises  to flourish  is an enabling climate  --  one  that includes
competition,  adequate  infrastructure,  and  institutions.  Competition  fosters
innovation,  the  diffusion  of  technology,  and  the  efficient  use  of  resources.
Third,  successful  economic  development  requires  the integration  of countries
with  the global economy.  Openness to  international  flows of goods,  services,
capital,  labor, technology,  and ideas  spurs  economic growth.  Fourth,  a  stable
macroeconomic  foundation  is essential  to sustained progress.
The  experience  of  NICs  illustrates  the  importance  of  economic  growth
(associated  with  market  forces)  and  human  development  (associated  with  state
intervention).  The  issue,  however,  is:  Has  free  market  really  fostered  economic
growth?  or was  it promoted  by  a  carefully  guided  government  intervention?  Two
World  Bank's  economists,  Summers  and  Thomas  (1993:  pp.  241-54)  argue  that  all
NICs  combined  the  best  of  state  and  market  by  recognizing  their  limits  and
capabilities.  It appeared  that  the NICs fully understand  the Keynesian  principle  on
state and market which  states  that "the important thing  for government  is not to do
the  things  which  individuals  are  already  doing,  but  to  do  those  things  which  at
present  are  not done at all"  (Keynes  1926,  reprinted  in  1972).  The  NICs  have used
the  mechanism  of  government  aggressively  to  guide  the  statecraft  so  that  the
industrial-pushed  economic  growth  within  a  framework  of  market  has  operated
cooperatively.  For  the  World  Bank,  the  ingredients  of  the  Korean  Model,  for
example, are  (The Economist,  1995:  June 3, p. 4):
. a  judicious  mixture  of  macroeconomic  stability,  private  enterprise,
competition,  investment  in  education,  and  strikingly  successful  (for the most
part)  subsidies  for  exporters.  At  the  same  time,  South  Korea's  example
sustains  those who  emphasize  that prices  need not be  free nor markets  open.
24Development,  they  say,  is  not  a job  for  the  invisible  hand.  The  state  can
successfully lead a charge into "strategic" heavy industry.
The  assumption  of the World  Bank  was  that the NICs  have used  the state  in
fostering  free  markets  in  economic  development.  A  World  Bank  economist,
Husain  (1995:  p.  174))  concurs  that  "encouragingly,  most High  Performing  Asian
Economies  (HPAEs)  have consistently  maintained  macroeconomic  stability, avoided
high  inflation,  and  implemented  fiscal  discipline."  The  reality, however,  was  that
South Korea's  economic growth,  like those of other East Asian tigers of Hong Kong,
Singapore,  and Taiwan  has been  accompanied  with more repressive regimes  which
led  to  believe  that  autocracy  is  a  good  thing  for  development.  Beyond  the
macroeconomic  policy  and  management,  those  leaders  ventured  in  to  the  life  of
individual workers.  The Economist  (1995: June 3, p. 5) characterizes  that:
South  Korea's  labour  policies  were  especially  unpleasant.  The  country  was
built by men who worked  appalling  hours, led by obsessive bosses who, along
with their  workers,  slept on  the  docks  and  construction  sites.  ...  Anybody
who protested  got fired,  or jailed.  Under  Park Chung Hee  as well  as under
South  Korea's  next  soldier-president,  Chun  Doo Hwan,  labour  disputes  were
generally resolved by troops, tear gas and  truncheons.
Despite the popular belief,  the free market forces were hardly at work in these
countries.  Similar  to  some  progressive  East  European  countries  in the  1950s  and
1960s,  the HPAEs resembled  some characteristics  of communist  regimes:  more labor
out of people, command  economics  for output targets,  imposed  savings  which  were
taxed for  investment,  and less human  freedom.  Singular-minded  economic growth
has been achieved  by South Korea  and other NICs mainly through human  sacrifice.
During  these years,  the literacy  rate  and  life expectancy,  however,  have  improved
but the quality of education and life is still subject to question.
The government has,  of course,  intervened  in the macroeconomic  stability  by
managing  the  government  budget  which  has  often  been  deficit  spending  in  the
NICs  and other Emerging  NICs.  Without  a well-guided  macroeconomic  policy  and
management,  the domestic  savings  and foreign  funds  must be  used  to balance  the
budget  which  could  otherwise be allocated  for development  programs.  The  deficit
in  the  government  budget  often  leads  to  inflation  which  in  turn  fuels  a  greater
deficit by creating  a vicious  cycle.  The budgetary  deficit can  also create  overvalued
exchange  rates which lead  to export contraction  and frustrated  domestic producers.
Furthermore,  the overvalued  currency  would make  import less  expensive  which  in
25turn impacts  on  the  domestic  producers.  The  Emerging  NICs  demonstrate  that
governments  attempted  to  maintain  a  well-disciplined  macroeconomic
management.  In  Thailand,  for  example,  the  budget  deficit  is  limited  to  20%  of
government expenditure  and Malaysia contained  its deficit  to less than  20% of GDP.
South  Korea  and  Indonesia  also  managed  to  keep  their  macroeconomic  policies  to
foster  economic performance.
The  common  strategy  of NICs  was  that  the state intervened  aggressively  in
investing in  social as  well  as physical infrastructure  as preconditions  for  markets  to
operate  efficiently.  When  there  were  no  explicit  incentives  and/or  returns  for
market  to enter into such  investment,  the state naturally  intervened.  Similarly,  the
state investment in social  infrastructure  (such  as education  and  health)  was justified
because  literate  workforce  and  healthy  population  are  a  productive  investment.
The  state  investment  in  physical  infrastructure  (road, ports,  irrigation)  is  needed
because there again  the private sector has  less incentive  to participate.  The spillover
effects  of  investing  in  social  and  physical  infrastructure  are  that  they  provide
employment,  create  social  wealth  (literate  and healthy population)  and provide  the
incentive  and the foundation  for  the private  sector  to  take over  what they are  cable
of providing  in the economy.
Mechanics of Economic Growth
The  above  evidence  shows  that  the  governments  of  South  Korea  and  the
other  NICs  have played  a primary  role  in their  economic  development  efforts;  the
governance  of  market  forces  was  secondary.  Professor  Paul  Krugman  (1994)  of
Stanford  University  argues  that  leaders  of  NICs  did  not  share  the  faith  in  free
market  economics  nor  in  civil  liberties.  According  to  Krugman  (1994:  p.  62),  the
authoritative governments,  especially  in South  Korea, Singapore,  and Taiwan,  were
willing  to:
limit individual  liberties  in  the  interest  of  the common  good,  take  charge of
their  economies,  and  sacrifice  short-run  consumer  interest  for  the  sake  of
long-run  growth  would  eventually  outperform  the  increasingly  chaotic
societies  of the West.
Sustained economic  growth  and increasing  per capita  income  can only  occur
if there  is  a  rise  in  per  capita  inputs.  The  so-called  miracle  of NICs,  according  to
Krugman,  was  input-driven  growth  which  is  inevitably  limited.  He  states  that
26"mere increases  in  inputs,  without  an  increase  in  the  efficiency  with  which  those
inputs  are  used--investing  in  more  machinery  and  infrastructure--must  run  into
diminishing  returns"  (p.  67).  To  support  his  assertions,  Krugman  cites  a  famous
1957  estimate  of  MIT  Professor  Robert  Solow  who  concluded  that  "technological
progress has accounted  for 80 percent of the long-term rise in US per capita income,
which increased  investment in capital  explaining  only the remaining  20  percent"  (p.
68).  This  is not necessarily  true with new forms  of capital.  A study of  113 countries
by  Professor  Willis  Peterson  (1989)  of  the  University  of Minnesota  finds  that  the
rates  of  return  on  capital  do  not  vary  significantly  between  the  Less  Developed
Countries  (LDCs)  and  the  Developed  Countries  (DCs)  even  though  the  DCs  have
relatively more capital  per worker  than  LDCs.  According  to Peterson,  the variation
between  DCs and LDCs can  be explained  by the stock of physical  capital  per worker
and schooling at the  tertiary level.
The  recent  World  Bank  (1993)  study  The East  Asia Miracle  however  notes
that  two-thirds  of  the economic  growth  in the High  Performing  Asian  Economies
(HPAEs)  of Indonesia,  Japan,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  and  the  Four  Tigers  is  derived
from  "input-driven"  growth  while  the remaining  one-third  cannot be explained  by
mere  accumulation  of  resources;  therefore,  it  must  be  attributed  to  increased
efficiency  or total  factor productivity. 2 Krugman thinks that compared  to the former
Soviet Union,  the input-driven  growth is  an  inherently limited  process  whereby  the
Soviet growth  was virtually slowed  down.  Krugman  claims that what  he called  the
"Paper  Tiger"  achieved  rapid  growth  as  a result  of rapidly  increasing  educational
levels,  heavy  capital  investment,  huge  savings,  and  "astonishing  mobilization"  of
other  resources  "rather than  gains  in  efficiency."  Therefore,  the miracle  of NICs is
not so much  a miracle.  Frank Gibney  (1995),  president of the Pacific  Basin  Institute,
however,  argues  that the increased  economic growth  of these  countries  is  attributed
in  part  to  the  import  of  foreign  knowledge  and  technology  for  their  export-led
industrialization  strategy.  The  other  part  is  that  increased  productivity  is  a
continuous  enhancement  in  educational  opportunities,  better  industrial
organization  and  management,  and  improved  work  practices.  Gibney  then
emphasizes  that  "interlocking  cooperation  of free  enterprise,  government  financial
intervention,  and  a  guidance-minded  technocratic  bureaucracy  on  the  Japanese
2This depends  on how allocative  inputs are measured  and  defined,  especially in the various  forms of capital.  See,  for example, Professor Peterson's  1994 study which indicates that there is no residual.
27model"  is  the  most  important  (Gibney,  1995:  p.  171).  In  a  direct  response  to
Krugman, Gibney  remarks:
what the  East Asian  miracle  demonstrates  is  that  growth  economics  can  be
built  rather  quickly  through  a  combination  of  modern  technological
adaptation,  entrepreneurial  push,  and  government  supported  international
marketing  --  all  based  on  cultures  that  eschew  adversarial  give-and-take  in
favor of an ethic of group relationships,  not individual responsibility  (p.  172).
Dr. Ishrat Husain,  a World  Bank's  chief economist  (1995:  p.  193),  asserts  that
"miracle"  is not probably too strong a word because
the High  Performing Asian  Economies are  unique  in combining rapid growth
with  both  highly equal  income  distributions  and  reduction  in poverty  ....
The  conditions  for  social  harmony  and  stability,  which  are  essential  for
sustained growth, are also present in those countries.
Husain's  characterization  of  the  HPAEs  has  naturally  raised  questions  from
the  perspectives  of  the  way  in  which  political  stability  and  social  harmony  were
achieved  and  maintained.  The  level  of  "highly  equal  income  distribution  and
reduction in  poverty" may not necessarily  be  attributed  to "rapid growth."  A range
of government  interventions  in  social  welfare  policies,  such  as  housing  projects  in
South  Korea,  have  been  associated  with  more  equal  income  distribution.  All
commentators,  however,  agree  that  the  level  of investment  in  physical  and  human
capital  in  HPAE  exceeds  those  of  other  countries  in  terms  of  per  capita  income
growth  and  human  development.  The  Emerging  NICs  also  follow  investment-
driven  economic  growth  where  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  and  Thailand
have achieved  a relatively  higher human  development  as  well  as economic  growth.
In the early  1960s, both South Korea  and Taiwan  were considered  to be in economic
chaos but  since then  the investment  as  10%  of the GDP rose to  30%  in  1990s.  This
investment  effort  and  the  increase  in  educational  level  and  skilled  labor  force
attribute  to  the  economic  growth.  Similarly,  the  Emerging  NICs  have  emulated
their more developed  neighbors  by using the input-driven  growth.
The notion  of economic  growth,  driven by  inputs,  is  not  new.  Economists
have  long  believed  that  savings  and  investment  bring  economic  growth.  In  1952,
Professor  Hans  Singer  by  using  the  Harrod-Domar  model,  argued  that  a  country
with  6%  saving  and  a  population  growth  rate  of  1.25%  would  be  a  "stationary
economy."  Singer  then emphasized  that by raising the rate of saving  to over 16.25%
28with  a rate of population  growth of 1.25%  (1952),  at least a 2% growth of per capita
income  would  be  achieved.  Prior to this,  the  Cambridge  model  of the  1940s  and
1950s  assumed  that  output would grow in  proportion  to  inputs  (i.e.,  capital)  used.
Similarly,  Rosenstein-Roden  (1943)  put  forward  the  notion  of  a  big  push  for  an
economy  to propel  into  the process  of self-sustaining  industrialization  and  then  to
rapid  economic  growth.  These  ideas  at  the  beginning  of  the  Development
Economics  convinced  policy-makers  and  economic  planners  to  pursue  growth
strategies  in  economic  development.  When  saving  and  investment  cannot  be
found  within their  underdeveloped  economies,  an injection of imported  capital  was
an  answer  to  resuscitate  the  economy.  In  1957,  Solow  (pp.  312-20)  found  that
sustained  economic  growth  was  possible  only  through  exogenous  technological
change.  But later, however,  Romer  (1986)  and Lucas (1988)  found  that technological
change  is  endogenous,  and  that  education  and  knowledge  produce  positive
externalities  or  increasing  return.  Whether  technology  comes  from  within  or
outside, one thing in Asian growth  debate is certainly clear as Krugman  (1995: p.  177)
concludes:  ".  . . one way to get a lot of output is to use a lot of inputs."  It is true that
Japan  and  the NICs  used  external  assistance  initially  in  the  development  of  their
human  resources  (especially  by  sending  their  young  people  to  American
universities)  and  obtaining  the  financial  resources.  After  their  success,  the  East
Asian countries  are  now exporters  of technical  expertise  and financial  assistance  to
other  countries.
The Role of State and Markets
Conventionally,  it  is  viewed  that  Japan  and  NICs  achieved  their  economic
success  based purely on free market,  open  trade,  and profit motive.  Initially,  Japan
and  South  Korea  undertook  land  reform  and  encouraged  private  entreprenuership
in economic  development.  South Korea's  economic  growth started  with  a  series  of
liberalization  policy  reforms  between  1963  and  1965.  The  leadership  for
liberalization  was  provided  by  the  military  following  the  coup  of  1961.
Subsequently,  the  Korean  state,  and  the  states  in  other  NICs  as  well,  exercised
substantial  power  in  designing  and  implementing  development  policy  and  in
controlling  the economy.  The is a direct emulation of Japan.
Japan,  despite  its free market  philosophy, has used  a  well-crafted  mechanism
by combining its cultural  values based  on Confucian  ideology and economic realities
29to guide their macroeconomic  management.  Fingleton  (1995: p.  70-71)  states that the
Ministry  of Finance  (MOF)  is  the  capstone  of  a  Confucian  system  of  power  and
"Japan's  invisible  leviathan"  which  is  roughly  pyramidal.  Fingleton  characterizes
MOF  men  as  truly Nobel-caliber:  "brilliant, creative,  tenacious,  public-spirited"  (p.
71).  Under this MOF hierarchical  structure is the rest of big banks, key bureaucratic
agencies  (in charge  of taxing,  spending,  and  defense) including  the  widely-known
Ministry  of  International  Trade  and  Industry  (MITI)  and  the  cabinet.  Fingleton
(1995)  further  emphasizes  that the believers  of laissez-fair  economics  in Japan  now
find that the foundation  of Japanese  higher economic performance  is not necessarily
the free  market  forces  but  the proper  management  of such forces  for  their  national
interest.  The  MITI  for  example,  Fingleton  argues,  has  recently  given  primary
consideration  to  the  so-called  ABCD  industries:  automation,  biotechnology,
computers,  and  data processing.  The  rapidly  changing national  political leadership
over  the  chaotic Japanese  market  tends otherwise  to believe  that their governance  is
in  disarray.  But,  the  truth  of  the matter  is  that  Japanese  economy  is  run  by  the
powerful  MOF  whose  invisible  tradition  has  been  kept  in line  with  the Confucian
notion  that "power  is exercised  more effectively  when  its  is least obtrusive"  (p.  72).
In Japan, Fingleton  then  concludes,  that "politicians  reign  and bureaucrats  rule"  (p.
85).  Japan,  however,  is not the  only country  with  a  strong bureaucracy;  other  high
performing  industrialized  countries,  especially  France,  Germany,  and  Switzerland
do have  elite  bureaucrats  as  well  (Fingleton,  1995:  p.  70).  This  is  also  a  common
characteristic  among  the  East  Asian  Four  Tiger  countries.  But,  Fingleton
summarizes  that  "the Japanese  civil  service's  power--especially  that of the  MOF--is
in a league of its own" (p. 85).
In South  Korea,  a  closely  collaborated  force  between  the  private  and  public
sectors  has  pushed  its  economic  success.  Gibney  (1995)  concurs  that businessmen
and  bureaucrats  have  lost little time  waiting  for  Adam  Smith's  "invisible hand"  to
operate.  Under  a  system  of Chaebols family-held  conglomerates  such  as  Daewoo,
Hyundai,  Lucky-Goldstar,  and  Samsung,  South  Koreans  unite  to  formulate
international  strategies  (Hodgetts  and  Luthans,  1994:  p.  20).  Many  key  managers,
who attended  school  in  the  West,  work  closely  with the government  by exercising
considerable  political  and  economic  power  in  South  Korea  to  advance
industrialization.  In Japan,  Keiretsu,  the organizational  arrangement  among  large
corporations,  also  shows  similar  binding  together  by  cross-ownership,  long-term
business  dealings,  interlocking  directorates,  and  social  ties (Cutts,  1992:  pp.  48-55).
30For example,  according  to Holstein  et  al  (1990:  pp.  98-104)  Keiretsu of  Mitsubishi
Group  consists  of 28  core  members  including  the triad  of Mitsubishi  Corporation
(which  is  a  trading  company),  Mitsubishi  Bank  (which  finances  the  Keiretsu
operations),  and  Mitsubishi  Heavy  Industries  (which  is  a  leading  global
manufacturer).  Even in the US, according  to Business  Week  (1992, January  27: p.  53
and  p.  55),  Ford,  Deere  &  Company,  and  other  multinationals  are  emulating
Keiretsu-like arrangements.
Environmental Chaos  and Worker Unrest
The  credibility  of  development  models  that  led  to  higher  performing
economies  in  East  Asia  has  been  undermined  by  their  very  success.  The  recent
evidence  shows  an  increase  in  labor  unrest  and  ecological  destruction,  especially
after  the emergence  of more  democratic  leaders.  Broad  et  al  (1990-91)  illustrate  a
host of evidence  that exists  to suggest the cautions  in the face  of economic  triumph.
Broad et al (1990-91:  p. 144) write that:
Warning  signs  are  surfacing  in  South Korea  and Taiwan,  the miracle  models
of capitalist development.  After decades  of systematic exploitation,  the South
Korean  labor  force  erupted  in  thousands  of  strikes  during  the  late  1980s,
undermining  the  very  basis  of  that  country's  export  success.  Meanwhile,
decades  of  uncontrolled  industrial  development  have  left  large  parts  of
Taiwan's landscape with poisoned soil and toxic water.
Some  experts  and environmentalists  predict  that  certain  areas of Taiwan  will
not  be  suitable  for  human  habitation  if  the  current  rate  of  industrial  pollution
continues by year 2000.  In South Korea, Broad et al  (1990-91:  p. 146)  argue that:
In the  South Korean  centralized  authoritarian  development  created  a  virtual
time bomb.  ...  Taking advantage of a small democratic opening between  1987
and  1989, more than  7,200 labor  disputes broke out, compared  with only  1,026
from  1981  through 1986.
Other  information  demonstrates  that  14,000  policemen  stormed  the Hyundai
shipyard  in  March  1989  to  put  down  a  109-day  strike.  Overall,  those  who  are
familiar  with  South  Korea  know  that growth  has  been  achieved  by  authoritarian
control  by  violent  repression  of political  opposition,  especially  among  the  young.
Similarly,  the  authoritarian  and  so-called  democratic  governments  in  Indonesia,
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and  Thailand  have  exercised  their
power  in a manner  that has violated human  rights and basic political  freedom.
31A powerful  environmental  movement  in Taiwan has  challenged  the  island's
fragile social consensus on export-oriented  growth.  According  to a  1985 survey, 59%
of Taiwanese  favor  environmental  protection  over  economic  growth  (Broad  et al.:
1990-91  p.  147).  The evidence  demonstrates  that South Korea and Taiwan  no longer
maintain  the status  quo  of their  development  path by  repressing  workers  and  by
abusing  the environment.  Technocrats  and  authoritarian  regimes  in  South  Korea
achieved  a  "miracle"  growth  by  "command"  economics.  More  recently,  the
government  incentives,  subsidies,  and  even  coercion  pushed  for  the  industrial
drive in heavy industry (iron  and steel).  This is  the pattern  of the industrial  push  of
the  1960s  in  the  light industries  (textile)  and  recently  into the heavy  and electronic
industries  (cars,  VCR, and computers).
Despite  the relative  greater  income  equity  in  South  Korea  and  Taiwan,  it  is
ironic  to  see  rising  labor  and  environmental  movements  that  threaten  the
traditional  growth  model.  Japan  on  the other  hand  seems  to  be  less misled  by the
free  market  vision and  more  conscious  of  the role  of the  state  in  these  two  critical
areas  of  worker  satisfaction  and  environmental  protection.  Some  countries
achieved  redistribute  reform  in  the  process  to  industrialization  by  providing
significant  advancement  in health  and  education.  But,  many  countries  have failed
to integrate  the areas  of ecological sustainability  and political  participation.  As seen
in  South  Korea  and  Taiwan,  the  free  market  on  the  face  value  is  not  the panacea.
Ordinary  citizens  should  be  involved  in  the  decision  making  process  to reflect  the
civic responsibility of the state.
VI
CONCLUDING  REMARKS
It  has  long been  the  tradition  of  the  Britton  Woods  institutions  to  advise
poorer  countries  to  adopt  a  set  of policies  within  the  framework  of  a  prescriptive
structural  adjustment  package.  Every  package  includes:  reduce  the  government
expenditure  to  balance  the  budget,  eliminate  trade  barriers  and  social  subsidies,
encourage  exports,  tighten  the  monetary  policy  to  combat  inflation,  devaluate
currency  to promote  export  and discourage  import,  dismantle  nationalist barrier  to
foreign  investment,  and  guarantee  foreign  direct  investment.  For  a  better
macroeconomic  management,  this  is a good,  practical model assuming  other  factors,
32such as the environment  and the response and  social  cost emanating from  poor and
hungry people, which are outside the parameters of economic policy  considerations.
But the legacy behind  the emergence  of NICs  is that Japan, South  Korea,  and
other East Asian countries  after World War II realized  that they need  to pay back the
loan and the debt.  A package of structural adjustment would  be the best way to pay
back  the  heavy  borrowings.  The NICs  have  followed  the  strategies  and  become
better off than those who did not re-adjust  their economies.  Broad et  al  (1990-91:  p.
150)  provide  the  underline  explanation  for  the  development  trap  that  "creditor
banks,  using  the World  Bank  and IMF  as enforcers,  conditioned  debt rescheduling
on  acceptance  of export-oriented  structural  adjustment  package."  The  commodity
exporting  developing  countries  had to  deal with severe  difficulties  for two  reasons:
gradual  decline  of market  prices  and the increasing  level  of trade  protectionism  in
the  Western  countries.  For  those  countries,  the  re-payment  of  loans  and  debt
servicing  has  become  problematic  and  the  structural  adjustment  program  turned
out  to  be  costly.  More  critical  of the  consequences,  Broad  et al  (1990-91:  p.  150)
conclude  that  "structural  adjustment  in  practice  has  damaged  environments,
worsened  structural  inequities,  failed  even  in  the  very  narrow  goal  of  pulling
economies  forward,  and  by-passed  popular  participation."  For  the NICs,  Western
support continues  in a  form of financial,  technical,  and market  opportunities.
One of the unique characteristic of Japan, South Korea,  and other NICs  is that
government  is  not adversarial  to  economic  growth;  the state  is  a  partner  in  every
aspect  of  development.  The  experience  suggests  that  the  success  depends  on  the
ability of government  to stay above  the vested interest groups to help create  a social
and  physical  environment  with  a  "reasonable"  political  and  economic  freedom  for
the market to operate openly.  For that, government must first ensure  that there is  a
market to operate.  Market only  exists when  they have consumers  with  purchasing
power and producers  with products and services.  One of the major  problems in  the
developing  world  is  that there  is  no  purchasing  power  to create  effective  demand
(Nepal,  for  example).  One  way to foster  this,  as  other  NICs  did,  is  to have  land
reform, progressive  taxation,  and  advancement  of workers'  rights and  income.  At
the start of  their  industrialization  process,  Japan,  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  and  other
East Asian  countries  at  varying  degrees  gradually  developed  the  income  of  their
workers by creating domestic market and by opening up their market to global forces
and  to  foreign  investment  and  competition.  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  may  have
33been even more successful if they  had combined  their early land reform with strong
commitment  to  environmental  protection,  equity  consideration,  and  worker
participation  in decision-making.  The advantage  of low wages  in  South  Korea and
Taiwan  was that they needed  to maintain  the comparative  advantage  in exports.  As
these economies  shifted into value  added products  with higher  technical  education,
it  is  anticipated  that  raising  the  salary  level  and  enhancing  domestic  market
development  will  result.
The NICs also had  other advantages  as well.  The experience  of World War  II
and the  Korean  War gave rise  to extraordinary  determination  to succeed.  This was
complemented  by  the  Confucian  motto  of  "hard  work,  obedient,  and  courteous."
The ideology  of Confucian  has  well  served  the NICs to  achieve  their national  goal.
Moral  education  emphasizes  the  submergence  of individual  wishes  for  the state's
goal; loyalty to  the authority;  the respect  for  harmonious  and just  social order;  and
diligence,  moral  obligation,  and  personal  responsibility.  The  authoritarian  leaders
of  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  and  Singapore  took  the  advantage  of  this  deep-rooted
Confucian  cultural  heritage  to  advance  the  cooperative  and  harmonious
relationship  that  led  to  high  growth.  The  economic  advantage  of  this  cultural
endowment  is  that  they  could  reduce  the  opportunity  cost  and  other  externality
costs.  These  so-called benevolent  leaders,  who  acted on the teachings  of Confucian,
have  been served  by the ideology  that says  "ruler  is the wind,  people are the grass.
When wind  blows, grass sure  to be bent."  As  these societies  become more open  and
democratic  the  wind  may  change  direction  as  has  already  been  shown  in  South
Korea  and Taiwan  with  signs  of labor  unrest  and  the  environmental  movement.
South  Korea's  economic  and  human  development  progress  has  to  be
attributed  to  their  cultural  endowments,  particularly  the  Confucian  ideology  to
which  their  leaders  have  adhered  in  advancing  their  economic  growth  through
authoritative  rule and  a harmonious  way of life.  Fareed  Zakaria  (1994),  Managing
Editor of Foreign  Affairs  (Council on Foreign Relations),  who  interviewed  Lee Kuan
Yew,  former  Prime  Minister  of  Singapore,  for  the  article  "Culture  is  Destiny"
explained  how their Confucian  culture impacted  the  economic  development  in East
Asian  countries.3 In  Sri  Lanka,  their  cultural  traditions  and  Buddhist  teachings
3For a discussion on the aspect of cultural endowments  in economic development,  see Professor Vernon Ruttan  (1988  and  1995).  In  his  well-known  Induced  Innovation  Model  of  the relationships  between
changes in resources  endowments,  cultural endowments,  technology, and institutions, Professor Ruttan emphasizes  the importance  of cultural  endowments  which  are largely absent in mainstream economic discussion.
34have  played  a  significant  role  in  promoting  physical  well-being  and  developing
mental-faculties  (Caldwell  et al.,  1989;  Mendis,  1992a and  1994).  The way in which
Confucian  ideology  was  deep-rooted  in  South  Korea  and  other  NICs  (specially
Singapore and Taiwan) and how it was used by their strong-will leaders  gave rise to
economic  growth  by  minimizing  social  and  opportunity  costs  which  otherwise
retarded  export-led  development  with labor unrest, environmental  cost,  individual
rights,  and  political  freedom.  The  advocacy  of  cultural  traditions  which  were
nurtured by Buddhist teachings  gave rise to primacy of health and knowledge  in the
Sri  Lankan  society.  The  emphasis  of  cultural  endowments,  which  are  difficult  to
quantify  in  economic  terms,  has  likely  laid  the  necessary  underpinning  for  South
Korea  to launch a breath-taking  economic growth  while  Sri Lanka  launched  a snail-
pace growth accompanied  with a relatively  literate and higher  longevity population.
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